What Type Of Enterprise Forges Close Links With Universities And Government Labs? Evidence From CIS 2 by Hoareau, Cathy & Mohnen, Pierre
Montréal
Mars 2002
Série Scientifique
Scientific Series
    2002s-25
What Type of Enterprise Forges
Close Links With Universities
and Government Labs?
Evidence From CIS 2
Pierre Mohnen, Cathy Hoareau
CIRANO
Le CIRANO est un organisme sans but lucratif constitué en vertu de la Loi des compagnies du Québec. Le
financement de son infrastructure et de ses activités de recherche provient des cotisations de ses organisations-
membres, d’une subvention d’infrastructure du ministère de la Recherche, de la Science et de la Technologie, de
même que des subventions et mandats obtenus par ses équipes de recherche.
CIRANO is a private non-profit organization incorporated under the Québec Companies Act. Its infrastructure and
research activities are funded through fees paid by member organizations, an infrastructure grant from the
Ministère de la Recherche, de la Science et de la Technologie, and grants and research mandates obtained by its
research teams.
Les organisations-partenaires / The Partner Organizations
•École des Hautes Études Commerciales
•École Polytechnique de Montréal
•Université Concordia
•Université de Montréal
•Université du Québec à Montréal
•Université Laval
•Université McGill
•Ministère des Finances du Québec
•MRST
•Alcan inc.
•AXA Canada
•Banque du Canada
•Banque Laurentienne du Canada
•Banque Nationale du Canada
•Banque Royale du Canada
•Bell Canada
•Bombardier
•Bourse de Montréal
•Développement des ressources humaines Canada (DRHC)
•Fédération des caisses Desjardins du Québec
•Hydro-Québec
•Industrie Canada
•Pratt & Whitney Canada Inc.
•Raymond Chabot Grant Thornton
•Ville de Montréal
© 2002 Pierre Mohnen et Cathy Hoareau. Tous droits réservés. All rights reserved. Reproduction partielle permise
avec citation du document source, incluant la notice ©.
Short sections may be quoted without explicit permission, if full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.
ISSN 1198-8177
Les cahiers de la série scientifique (CS) visent à rendre accessibles des résultats de recherche effectuée au
CIRANO afin de susciter échanges et commentaires. Ces cahiers sont écrits dans le style des publications
scientifiques. Les idées et les opinions émises sont sous l’unique responsabilité des auteurs et ne représentent
pas nécessairement les positions du CIRANO ou de ses partenaires.
This paper presents research carried out at CIRANO and aims at encouraging discussion and comment. The
observations and viewpoints expressed are the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily
represent positions of CIRANO or its partners.
What Type Of Enterprise Forges Close Links With
Universities And Government Labs?
Evidence From CIS 2*
Pierre Mohnen† and Cathy Hoareau‡
Résumé / Abstract
Cette étude essaye de découvrir quels sont les facteurs économiques qui poussent les
entreprises à chercher de l’information pour innover auprès des universités et des laboratoires
publics de recherche ou à coopérer avec ces  deux institutions. Nous nous servons des données de
la seconde vague d’enquêtes communautaires d’innovation européennes (CIS2) pour
l’Allemagne, la France, l’Espagne et l’Irlande. Nous estimons, d’une part, un modèle probit
ordonné pour les universités et les laboratoires publics de recherche comme sources
d’information, en contrôlant pour un biais de sélection et,  d’autre part, un modèle probit trivarié
pour les décisions successives d’innover, de collaborer et en particulier de collaborer avec les
universités et les laboratoires publics de recherche, avec deux censures des données. Nous
trouvons que les entreprises intensives en recherche et les innovateurs radicaux vont chercher de
l’information auprès des universités et les laboratoires publics mais ne collaborent pas eux. Ces
collaborations sont le fait de grandes firmes, d’entreprises breveteuses, et de celles qui reçoivent
du support gouvermental pour innover. Des entreprises qui font partie d’un groupe ont tendance à
collaborer mais pas nécessairement avec les universités et les laboratoires publics re recherche.
This paper tries to uncover some of the economic factors that encourage firms to seek
information from universities and government labs or to collaborate with these institutions. We
exploit the information contained in the second Community Innovation Surveys (CIS2) for
France, Germany, Ireland and Spain. We estimate an ordered probit model on the importance of
knowledge sourcing from universities and government labs controlling for selection bias, and a
trivariate probit model explaining the innovation, collaboration in innovation, and collaboration
with universities and government labs decisions with twice censored data. R&D-intensive firms
and radical innovators tend to source knowledge from universities and government labs but not
to cooperate with them directly. Outright collaborations in innovation with universities and
government labs is characteristic of large firms, firms that patent or those that receive
government support for innovation. Members of an enterprise group tend to cooperate in
innovation but not directly with universities or government labs.
Mots-clés : Innovation, collaborations universités-entreprises, laboratoires publics de recherche,
sources d’information pour innover, CIS2
Keywords: Innovation, industry-university collaborations, knowledge sourcing, government labs,
CIS2
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21. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to explore the factors that allow firms to benefit from knowledge developed in
universities and government labs or that drive them to collaborate with these institutions. A number of
studies have examined this question from various perspectives: the characteristics of the knowledge being
transferred, the complementarity between the assets of the two parties involved in the collaboration, and the
organizational aspects facilitating collaboration and knowledge transfer between firms and
universities/research labs. Santoro and Gopalakrishnan (2000) review this literature and examine in
particular the organizational dimension of industry-university collaborations. Hall, Link and Scott (2000)
conclude from their analysis of partnerships in the U.S. Advanced Technology Program that universities
are invited to collaborate with industry (as a contractor or as a research partner) in projects that involve new
science, unknown technological territory. We shall focus on the economic determinants of collaboration
and knowledge-sourcing from universities and government labs, factors such as size, group membership,
degree of innovativeness, growth and government support.
Universities and government laboratories are more than private firms heavily involved in basic R&D
because it has the character of a public good. Many studies, starting with Mansfield (1980), estimate a high
rate of return on basic R&D. Adams (1990) estimates high spillover effects from academic R&D. Jaffe
(1989) and Acs, Audretsch and Feldman (1992) even find that the geographical proximity to universities
increases innovation, be it measured by the degree of patenting or by the number of new products
introduced in the market. Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1998) find that university patents are more
important (cited over a few generations of citations) and more general (cited in a broad range of fields) than
the average patent. There is thus a fair amount of empirical evidence showing that academic institutions
produce substantial R&D spillovers.
Firms should therefore be interested in forging links, perhaps even in collaborating with universities or
government laboratories in order to capture timely new technological opportunities stemming from basic
research. Indeed, proximity to basic science is reported by Cohen (1995) to be one of the main determinants
of innovation. Governments in their quest to maximize the social return of innovation should also be
concerned with fostering such links between private firms and basic research institutions. Not all firms,
though, are ready to seek such links and to be able to benefit from them. It would be interesting to know
what profile of firm it takes, for instance size, group affiliation, or the presence of  research activities, to
seek close contacts and collaborate with centers of basic research. Knowing that, governments could focus
their attention to this type of firms to maximize the efficiency in the allocation of public R&D money.
The CIS2 (the second European Community Innovation Surveys) database contains two types of
information regarding industry links with universities and government labs. One is about the role of
universities or government labs as sources of information for innovation, and the other is about
collaboration with universities or government labs. Given the other information about enterprises that is
contained in the innovation surveys, we try to uncover some of the factors that encourage firms to interact
with universities or government labs.
2. DATA
Our analysis of what determines the links between enterprises and universities/government laboratories is
based on data from the Second Community Innovation Survey (CIS 2). Eurostat provided us with data from
CIS2 in a micro-aggregated form for the manufacturing sectors of France, Germany, Ireland and Spain and
for the service sectors of France, Germany and Ireland.
The data relate to innovation activities conducted in 1994-96. Firms which had introduced a technologically
new or improved product or process, or which had unsuccessfully tried to do so or were still in the process
of doing so during this period, were asked to fill out the full Innovation Survey questionnaire. Two
questions are relevant for our study. One is about the sources of information for innovation, two of which
are universities or higher education institutes (SUNI) and government or private non-profit research
3institutes (SGMT). We interpret this variable as revealing an active search by enterprises for information
from those two sources in the innovation process. The other one is about collaboration in matters of
innovation with each of these two sets of institutions that we shall name in the sequel universities and
government labs. We only examine cooperation with national universities (CO61) and government labs
(CO71). We do so because in all four countries national cooperation is by far the most important.
Cooperation with foreign universities and government research institutes are often non-existent.
In a preliminary study we examined the determinants of the sources of information for innovation and  of
collaboration in innovation separately for universities and for government labs. Since the results were very
similar for both, we decided to merge them and created two new variables:
· SBOTH, representing sources of information for innovation from universities or government labs. It
takes the highest value of the ordinal variables SUNI and SGMT (that take the values 0 if irrelevant or
1 through 3 according to the degree of importance).
· CBOTH, representing collaboration in innovation with national universities or national government
labs. This is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 0 if no collaboration exist with either of
them and 1 if cooperation occurs with at least one of them.1
In our search for potential explanatory variables we are constrained by the set of variables for which we
have data in CIS 2, the availability of those data for all countries, and the concern for exogeneity and
parsimony. The variables we shall consider and their assumed effects are in order:
· Scientific sectors dummy. Each industry, because of its technology and the type of products it
produces might have a different relationship with universities and governement labs in terms of
knowledge outsourcing or outright research collaboration. For simplicity, we distinguish between firms
that belong to scientific sectors, with a higher intensity of innovation and R&D, and those that belong
to more traditional industries. In the scientific sectors we have classified those that produce chemicals,
machinery and equipment, vehicules, electrical and electronic products, computer services and
engineering services. In these industries the R&D/sales ratio was on average greater than 1.5% for all
firms in our sample. The industry groups with their abbreviations are presented in appendix 1.
· Size. Size is measured by the logarithm of the number of employees. We expect bigger firms to have
the minimum amount of qualified people, research effort, and overall connections to find it useful to
establish contacts with universities and government laboratories.2
· Being part of a group. Firms that belong to a larger group might through this network be able to tap
more easily information from universities/government labs or establish easier contacts with them. The
argument is the same as for size, except that here it relates to an external scale effect.3
· Merger. We expect recently merged firms to benefit from access to universities and government labs
because of their new partners, their more diversified knowledge base and their bigger size.
· Growth in employment. Growing firms are more likely to be dynamic, to hire researchers from
universities or government research institutes, or to have the internal expertise that enables them to
capture information from these institutions that is useful for innovation.
· Internal R&D over sales. The higher the R&D intensity, the more we expect firms to feel the need to
have ties with basic research, which tends to be conducted in universities and public research
institutions.
· Innovation expenditures other than R&D. This variable is defined as the ratio to sales of total
innovation expenditures minus internal R&D expenses. It regroups acquisition of R&D services,
acquisition of machinery and equipment linked to product and process innovations, industrial design,
                                                          
1 Universities and government labs received similar scores for the two questions. Only 15% of the
respondents gave a different (categorical) answer to SUNI and SGMT and 7% gave a different (binary)
answer to CO61 and CO71. In other countries than the four of our sample, because of different national
systems of innovation, firms may have different relationships with universities and with government
labs. But to the extent that links with them are established in order to get access to basic research, a
feature common to both of these institutions (more than for instance access to new talented labor), the
two institutions are likely to play a similar role in all countries.
2 We opt for the number of employees rather than sales to measure size, because the number of employees
is more likely than sales to be exogenous because of its sluggish adjustments.
3 Being part of a group means not being independent, but belonging to a consortium or a larger enterprise.
4training linked to technological innovation, and market introduction of technological innovations. We
expect more innovative firms to have closer links with universities and government labs. Since
innovation intensity on the output side (the share in sales of innovative products) is not available for
services, we use the input side measure instead.
· Government support. Firms that receive government support, for instance national champions, are
put in contact with basic research institutions, and encouraged if not obliged to collaborate with them.
· Being a radical innovator. A radical innovator is defined as one that has introduced on the market a
product that was new for the market, as opposed to a product new for the firm but not for the market.
We would expect radical innovators to be more in need of science and basic research conducted in
universities or government labs.
· Patents applied for. Patent holders know more about basic research. They are therefore more able to
absorb knowledge produced in universities and government laboratories and to collaborate with them. 4
Among the firms that source knowledge or have outright collaborations with universities or government
laboratories, product innovators are generally also process innovators and vice versa. We therefore could
not exploit the type of innovation dichotomy. We would expect start-up firms to be spinoffs of
universities/government labs and therefore have a privileged access to and collaboration experience with
these institutions (as documented in the field of biotechnology by Zucker and Darby (1995)).
Unfortunately, data on recently established firms is not available for France and Spain, whereas in Ireland it
covers all the firms with knowledge sourcing from universities and government labs and would thus be a
perfect predictor. We therefore could not examine this effect either.
We have eliminated all firms with a missing observation for one of our variables and all observations with
growth in employment or labor productivity lower than –50% and higher than 95%, with R&D/sales ratios
higher than 50%, and with log of labor productivity lower than 1.88 and higher than 7.69. Descriptive
statistics on the firm samples in manufacturing and services are given in tables 1.a and 1.b. We notice that
enterprises are on average bigger and more likely to belong to an enterprise group in manufacturing than in
services. In contrast, manufacturing firms are less dynamic in various ways: on average they have a lower
growth rate in employment, they more often receive government support and they have a lower R&D/sales
ratio.
As the services sample was rather small (around 10% of the total), we decided to pool the data of
manufacturing and services. Table 1.c gives some descriptive statistics on the pooled sample. Out of a total
of 9 191 firms (8 238 from manufacturing and 953 from services), 41% innovate, among which 66% draw
some knowledge from universities/government labs. Among the innovating firms, 48% collaborate in their
innovation activities, among which 56% collaborate with universities/government labs. If we compare the
means of our explanatory variables across subsamples, we notice that the frequency of firms belonging to
the scientific sectors increases as we move from the full sample of firms to the sample of innovating firms,
from the latter to the sample of collaborators in innovation and by yet another notch when we move to
collaborations with universities/government labs specifically. The same can be said about average size and
the frequency of government support in the various subsamples. Belonging to a group or doing R&D is
more frequent among innovating and collaborating firms, but not necessarily for those collaborating with
universities or government labs.
3. UNIVERSITIES OR GOVERNMENT LABORATORIES AS SOURCES OF INFORMATION
The variable SBOTH had to be answered (by innovators only) on an ordered scale from 1 to 3 if the source
of information was relevant, and by 0 if it was not relevant. The natural model to estimate in this case is a
                                                          
4  Data on mergers and patent applications are unavailable for Spain and radical innovations are only
measured for manufacturing. When an explanatory variable is only available for a subset of firms, it
takes a zero value for the other firms. Being a radical innovator should thus be understood as “being a
radical innovator if in manufacturing”, and likewise patents applied for means “patents applied for if in
Ireland, France or Germany”.
5probit model discriminating between innovating and non-innovating firms followed by a multinomial
ordered probit model determining the strength of the links with universities/government labs. Our
econometric model is thus as follows. Let us denote by INNO the binary variable that determines whether a
firm innovates or not. 5To simplify notation, we shall omit the enterprise index. To the binary variable
INNO corresponds a latent variable INNO*
eb += XINNO*                                                                                                            (1)
where X is a matrix of explanatory variables, b  are the coefficients to be estimated and e is a random
error term. To a zero response to INNO we associate a negative value for INNO*, and to a unity response
to INNO we associate a positive value for INNO*. To the observed ordered responses to the variable
SBOTH we associate a latent variable
hg += ZSBOTH *                                                                                                         (2)
where Z  is a matrix of explanatory variables, g is the coefficient to be estimated and h is a random error
term. The ordered responses to SBOTH correspond to intervals of realizations of the latent variables
conditional on being an innovating firm. For instance,
SBOTH=0  if INNO=1 and 1
* tSBOTH £
SBOTH=1  if INNO=1 and 2
*
1 tSBOTHt £<
SBOTH=2  if INNO=1 and 3
*
2 tSBOTHt £<
SBOTH=3  if INNO=1 and 3
* tSBOTH >
We assume e  and h  to be independently and identically jointly distributed according to a bivariate
normal distribution with mean 0, variance 1 and covariance r. We estimate the b, g and r parameters by
maximum likelihood, i.e. we maximize the likelihood of observing the 0/1 responses on INNO and the
ordered 0 to 3 responses to SBOTH that we observe in the whole sample. The log-likelihood function
underlying the estimation of university/government laboratory as a knowledge source is given by :
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where 1F  is the cumulative univariate normal distribution, 2F  is the cumulative bivariate normal
distribution, and the indices under the summation signs indicate the observations over which the sums are
taken.
We pool the data of the manufacturing sectors of the four countries, and those of the services sectors for all
countries but Spain. Any country heterogeneity that is not accounted for by the explanatory variables
                                                          
5 The variable INNO takes the value of one if either INPDT or INPCS for manufacturing and INSER for
services takes the value of one. INPDT (INPCS) is the binary variable indicating the introduction of a
technologically new or improved product (process). INSER is a binary variable indicating the
introduction of a new or significantly improved service or method to produce or deliver it.
6introduced in the model is captured by country fixed effects introduced in the specification of the latent
variables. The reference group pertains to the Spanish firms in the non-scientific sectors. The continuous
variables R&D/sales, employment growth, size and other-than-R&D innovation expenditures/sales are
expressed in deviations from the overall mean to have a scale similar to the binary variables.
Table 2 presents the estimates for the knowledge sourcing from universities/government labs. The model is
estimated with and without industry dummies. Those are supposed to capture industry-specific influences
for which we have no measure in this dataset (such as technological opportunity or industry-specific
innovation incentives). In the absence of industry dummies, a scientific industry dummy is introduced to
allow for an intercept shift for R&D-intensive industries. The estimates with industry-specific effects and
those which only distinguish between scientific and non-scientific industries are very similar. We find that
firms in the scientific sectors innovate more frequently than firms in the more traditional sectors. The same
can be said for larger firms and for firms that belong to a group. Growing firms, i.e. firms that show an
increase in the number of their employees between 1994 and 1996, are also more frequently innovative
than stagnant firms. Among the explanatory variables for knowledge sourcing, size, R&D intensity,
government support, patent applications and being a radical innovator increase the incidence of knowledge
tapping from universities/government labs. The coefficient r shows the correlation between the error terms
(due to unaccounted for factors) in the probability to innovate and the intensity of knowledge sourcing
equations. The correlation coefficient is not significant in both cases. The intensity of information sourcing
from universities/government labs, which we observe for innovators only, is thus not subject to a selection
bias, i.e. by some features that are particular to innovators and that would explain the degree of knowledge
sourcing from universities/government labs.
In table 3 we report the marginal effects of the main explanatory variables, taken at their mean values.  We
only present the estimates with industry dummies since the comparison of the log likelihoods of both
estimations shows that the specification with industry dummies is to be preferred. A one percent increase in
size increases the probability of innovating by 13.6 percentage points, members of a group have a 9.5
percentage points higher probability of innovating, and a 1 percent higher growth rate in the past increases
the probability of innovating by 11.3 percentage points.  Firms involved in recent mergers have a lower
probability of innovating. All explanatory variables with significant coefficients shift the distribution of
categorical responses on the knowledge sourcing from universities/government labs from lower scores to
higher scores. For example, a one percent increase in R&D/sales increases by 7.7 percentage points the
probability to consider universities or government labs as moderately important and by 14.2 percentage
points the probability to consider them as relatively important.
Previous studies have found that small firms benefit more from university-based research spillovers than
large firms, who rely more on their own R&D (Link and Rees (1990), Acs et al (1994), Audretsch and
Vivarelli (1994), Feldman (1994)). Our results are inconclusive in this regard, as we find that both larger
size and more R&D are correlated with more sourcing of knowledge from universities. In any case, the
externalities from basic research could be working indirectly rather than by way of knowledge borrowing
by private enterprises. Small firms (incremental innovators or mere imitators) may benefit indirectly from
university research by supplying inputs to large innovating firms, which derive knowledge from
universities (Duguet (2000) has found evidence of such effects). The finding that R&D intensity has a
positive coefficient is in line with the absorptive hypothesis capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990): you
need to do some R&D yourself to benefit from academic knowledge. Finally, the link between knowledge
sourcing from universities or government labs and the occurrence of radical innovations has also been
noticed by Baldwin and Da Pont (1996) with Canadian innovation survey data.  Which way the causality
goes, however, remains an open issue. To answer this question, we have to wait for the next round of
innovation surveys  to be able to conduct a vector autoregressive analysis.
4. UNIVERSITIES OR GOVERNMENT LABORATORIES AS COLLABORATORS IN
INNOVATION ACTIVITIES
7Although decisions on innovation and cooperation with various partners are probably taken simultaneously,
the innovation survey questionnaire is structured as if these decisions were taken sequentially. First
respondents have to tick whether they are innovative or not, then, if they declare themselves to be
innovative, they have to tick whether they cooperate in innovation or not, and finally, if they cooperate,
they have to indicate whether they do so with national universities or government labs or with other
partners. A sequential model of innovation where the three choices are supposed to be taken in a sequence
would posit a conditional independence between the individual decisions.6
Instead we model the data as obtained from a trivariate probit model with censoring. We assume three
latent variables, INNO*, CO* and CBOTH* that are respectively determined by the following equations:
11 1
* nx += WINNO                                                                                                              (5)
222
* nx += WCO                                                                                                                  (6)
and
333
* nx += WCBOTH                                                                                                         (7)
where 3,2,1, =iWi are matrices of explanatory variables, and 3,2,1, =iix  are the respective coefficients
to be estimated. The error terms 3,2,1, =iin  follow a trivariate standard normal distribution. 
7 The
observed responses on INNO, CO and CBOTH are one if the corresponding latent variables are positive
and zero otherwise.  As we observe data on cooperation for innovators only and data on cooperation with
universities/government labs for collaborators only, the likelihood function has four parts:
- to firms that do not innovate corresponds the likelihood A1 = )( 111 xW-F ,
- to firms that innovate but do not cooperate corresponds the likelihood A2 = ),,( 1222112 rxx WW -F ,
- to firms that innovate and cooperate but not with universities or government labs corresponds the
likelihood A3 = ),,,,( 2313,123322113 rrrxxx WWW -F ,
- to firms that innovate and collaborate with universities or government labs corresponds the likelihood
A4 = ),,,,( 2313,123322113 rrrxxx WWWF ,
where 1F  is the cumulative univariate normal distribution function, 2F is  the distribution function of a
bivariate normal distribution, 3F is the distribution function of  a trivariate normal distribution and ijr
are the contemporaneous correlation coefficients between the error terms. When the error terms in the three
equations (5) to (7) are uncorrelated, we have a sequential model of innovation. In that case, the bivariate or
trivariate normal distributions are equal to the products of univariate distributions. Each decision is then
taken as independent of previously taken decisions.
The log-likelihood function is thus given by
                                                          
6 As the number of explanatory variables are not the same for innovators and non-innovators, we cannot
use a multinomial logit model with the four options of innovative behaviour (not innovate, innnovate but
not cooperate, innovate and cooperate but not with univ/govt labs, innovate and cooperate with univ/govt
labs). We could do so for the last three options, but then we would have a potential selection bias if we
considered only innovators. In any case, the multinomial logit model by its underlying hypothesis of
independence of irrelevant alternatives also posits some independence between the alternatives.
7 Equation (1) and (5) have the same specification except for the distribution of the error term.
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In table 4 we report the estimated coefficients and the marginal effects of the corresponding variables.
When estimating the system of equations with correlated error terms, the estimated correlation coefficients
tended towards unity and only one coefficient turned out to be significant in the two collaboration
equations. The correlation structure seemed to capture most of the explanatory power, hinting to the
absence of common explanatory variables in the three equations. Since we did not have access to other
explanatory variables at this stage, we preferred estimating the sequential model. Actually this one boils
down to estimating each decision (innovation, cooperation, and cooperation with universities or
government labs) separately. However, the marginal effects that we compute concern respectively one, two
and three equations. As a result, the size of these effects diminishes as the number of simultaneous
decisions increases. For instance, the effect of size on cooperation with universities is the product of the
effects of size on the probability to innovate, to cooperate and to collaborate in particular with universities.
The estimates are similar when the model is estimated with separate industry dummies or with just a
dummy for the scientific industries. We only report the results obtained with a dummy characterizing the
scientific sectors, to add some further summary explanation of the industry effects.
The results on the probit to innovate in table 4 are similar to those in table 2. This comes as no surprise
since the error term of the probit equation in table 2 was basically uncorrelated with the error term in the
sources of information from universities/government labs equation.
The probit on whether firms collaborate or not indicates that all our explanatory variables contribute
positively to the probability of cooperating for innovation with various partners. Collaborations are more
frequent in firms that belong to the scientific sectors, in larger firms, in firms that belong to a group, that
receive government support for innovation, that are radical innovators, that patent and that spend larger
amounts on innovation expenditures. The estimated coefficients of employment growth and merger
occurrences are not significant. Our results are in line with the conclusions of Cassiman and Veugelers
(1999, 2000) who also report a positive effect of size and own R&D on R&D cooperation with various
partners using Belgian CIS1 data. A small difference with respect to their results is that we find that
collaboration in innovation is more strongly correlated with innovation expenditures as a whole than
merely with R&D expenditures. A one percentage point increase in innovation expenditures other than
R&D increases by 23.3 percentage points the probability of cooperating in innovation whereas a one
percentage point increase in R&D increases it only by some 13.4 percentage points.
The last probit equation discriminating between enterprises that collaborate with universities/government
labs vs. other partners produces the most interesting results of this paper. Again all our explanatory
variables contribute positively towards the explanation of this particular type of collaboration. A one
percent increase in size increases by 1.6 percentage points the probability of collaborating with
universities/government labs. Government supported firms have a 8.1 percentage points higher probability
to collaborate with universities/government labs than firms without government support. Patenting firms
have a 2% higher probability to collaborate with them than non-patenting firms, and firms in scientific
sectors a 1.7%  higher probability.  Firms that are part of a larger decision-taking unit and that do cooperate
tend to rely less on collaborations with universities/industries than independent firms that cooperate. It may
be that only the head firms of such larger units initiate these collaborations, whereas members are supposed
to follow the leader and collaborate with academic institutions or basic research centers only via the
headquarters. Collaborations with universities/government labs do not seem to be driven by recent growth
or merger experience. What is strange is that neither R&D-intensity, nor innovation-intensity, nor the fact
of being a radical innovator, are significantly related to collaborations with universities/government labs.
Leiponen (2001) obtains a positive size effect and also a positive research competence effect of R&D
collaborations with universities on Finnish innovation survey data.  Adams, Chiang and Jensen (2000) also
                                                          
8 All estimations are performed using the software Gauss windows NT/95 version 3.5.
9report a larger size and larger R&D effort for firms that are linked to federal labs via cooperative research
and development agreements compared to those linked to other laboratories. Now, if we consider the joint
decisions to innovate, collaborate at large and collaborate with universities/government labs specifically,
we also find a positive effect of R&D or innovation expenditures (see last column of table 4), but the
positive correlation is mainly due to the decision to collaborate in general.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusions we can draw from our analysis are that:
· Past growth helps in dissociating innovators from non-innovators but not at all in predicting links with
universities or government labs as sources of information or collaboration partners.
· The fact of having recently been involved in a merger has nothing to do with links to universities or
government labs.
· R&D-intensive firms and radical innovators tend to source knowledge from universities and
government labs but not to cooperate with them directly.
· Outright collaborations in innovation with universities and government labs is characteristic of large
firms , firms that patent or those that receive government support for innovation.
· Members of an enterprise group tend to cooperate in innovation but not directly with
universities/government labs. It is also not clear that they are more likely to tap knowledge from
universities and government labs.
The following theoretical explanations could be given to these results. First, they are consistent with the
absorption hypothesis that only firms that perform in-house R&D are able to extract knowledge from basic
research institutions. Second, cultures in business and basic research institutions are too far apart to lead to
cooperation unless the government establishes or forces a link. Firms that are supported by government to
innovate are put in touch with and supposed to collaborate with universities and public research centers.
Third, big size firms are more likely to have the means to attract competent researchers, to have an ongoing
R&D program, and to set aside a budget for collaborations with basic science to derive benefits from it in a
long-term perspective. Fourth, firms that are in touch with universities/government labs are likely to hold
patents, because a patent portfolio might act as a signal of competence to get access to basic research
performers.
We want to finish by raising two words of caution regarding the econometrics. Although we have tried to
account for correlations between the error terms in the various decisions, no correlation showed up between
the sources of knowledge for innovation and the probability of innovating, and too much correlation in
some sense showed up in the collaboration model equations. Either there is a common missing story in the
three equations or an identification issue. Another serious issue, common to most studies using innovation
survey data, is the endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables, in particular  size, R&D and patenting.
All three could cause as well as be caused by links with universitites/government labs. With cross-sectional
data it is hard to identify causalities. It is also possible that some of the uncovered correlations might
actually be due to joint correlations with other variables. Patenting, R&D, innovation expenditures other
than R&D, collaborations with basic research institutions, size and growth might all be related in a
systemic way feeding onto each other. Taking account of their simultaneity calls for a larger model with
additional variables and data requirements.
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Table 1.a Descriptive statistics
Pooled data of France, Germany, Ireland and Spain, 1994-1996
CIS2 (manufacturing)
In subsamples All firms Innovating firms Cooperating firms
All For
SUNI=1,2,3
for
SGMT=1,2,3
All for
CO61=1
for
CO71=1
Number of observations 8,238 3,527 2,145 1,917 1,713 678 637
% of firms in scientific sectors 0.337 0.504 0.552 0.536 0.564 0.634 0.600
Mean log of  nb of employees 4.659 5.301 5.498 5.442 5.684 6.002 5.895
% belonging to a group 0.430 0.609 0.635 0.608 0.732 0.764 0.724
Mean growth in employment 0.046 0.047 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.052 0.047
% with government support - 0.335 0.417 0.430 0.471 0.625 0.648
Mean R&D/sales ratio - 0.028 0.030 0.030 0.032 0.038 0.038
Mean of other innovation
expenditures/sales
- 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.024 0.024
% of radical innovators 0.238 0.557 0.585 0.597 0.618 0.642 0.647
% recent mergers - 0.067 0.075 0.074 0.080 0.091 0.091
% patents applied for - 0.339 0.396 0.365 0.410 0.459 0.455
France (in %) 0.446 0.444 0.378 0.334 0.508 0.525 0.447
Germany (in %) 0.098 0.166 0.220 0.215 0.119 0.063 0.177
Ireland (in %) 0.037 0.057 0.065 0.069 0.051 0.044 0.024
Spain (in %) 0.420 0.332 0.337 0.382 0.322 0.367 0.352
Table 1.b Descriptive statistics
Pooled data of France, Germany, and Ireland, 1994-1996
CIS2 (services)
Subsamples All firms Innovating firms Cooperating firms
All For
SUNI=1,2,3
for
SGMT=1,2,3
All for
CO61=1
for
CO71=1
Number of observations 953 241 138 110 96 45 33
% of firms in scientific sectors 0.343 0.618 0.623 0.636 0.563 0.667 0.727
Mean log of nb of employees 3.890 4.726 5.077 5.183 5.291 5.334 5.853
% belonging to a group 0.293 0.465 0.471 0.500 0.531 0.511 0.485
Mean growth in employment 0.066 0.096 0.095 0.080 0.074 0.064 0.011
 % with government support - 0.224 0.290 0.327 0.365 0.556 0.576
Mean R&D/sales ratio - 0.043 0.042 0.044 0.042 0.036 0.041
Mean other innovation
expenditures/sales ratio
- 0.028 0.032 0.033 0.029 0.038 0.041
% recent mergers - 0.087 0.101 0.082 0.125 0.111 0.152
% patents applied for - 0.199 0.246 0.273 0.323 0.444 0.546
France (in %) 0.408 0.291 0.196 0.264 0.354 0.378 0.485
Germany (in %) 0.407 0.539 0.638 0.582 0.438 0.533 0.485
Ireland (in %) 0.185 0.170 0.167 0.155 0.208 0.089 0.030
Notes: SUNI: universities and higher education institutes as sources of information for innovation (if yes, ordered
responses from 1 to 3); SGMT: government or private non-profit research institutes as sources of information for
innovation (if yes, ordered responses from 1 to 3); CO61: collaboration in innovation with national universities or
higher education institutions (binary responses, yes=1); CO71: collaboration with national government laboratories or
private non-profit institutions (binary responses, yes=1).
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Table 1.c Descriptive statistics
Pooled data of France, Germany, Ireland and Spain, 1994-1996
CIS2 (manufacturing/services)
In subsamples All firms Innovating firms Cooperating firms
All For SBOTH = 1,2,3 All For CBOTH = 1
Number of observations 9,191 3,768 2,502 1,809 1,017
% of firms in scientific sectors 0.338 0.511 0.544 0.564 0.608
Mean log of  nb of employees 4.579 5.264 5.429 5.663 5.808
% belonging to a group 0.416 0.600 0.618 0.721 0.705
Mean growth in employment 0.048 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.051
% with government support - 0.326 0.402 0.465 0.613
Mean R&D/sales ratio - 0.029 0.030 0.033 0.037
Mean of other innovation
expenditures/sales ratio
- 0.023 0.023 0.025 0.025
% of radical innovators 0.214 0.521 0.547 0.585 0.601
% recent mergers - 0.068 0.076 0.082 0.091
% of patents applied for - 0.330 0.375 0.406 0.444
France (in %) 0.442 0.435 0.381 0.500 0.460
Germany (in %) 0.130 0.190 0.226 0.136 0.159
Ireland (in %) 0.052 0.065 0.070 0.059 0.040
Spain (in %) 0.376 0.311 0.323 0.305 0.340
Notes: SBOTH: universities, higher education institutes, government or private non-profit research institutes as sources
of information for innovation (if yes, ordered responses from 1 to 3); CBOTH: collaboration in innovation with
national universities, higher education institutions, government laboratories or private non-profit institutions (binary
responses, yes=1).
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Table 2. Joint estimation of a probit on the probability to innovate and an ordered probit on “information from
universities/govt. labs”.
Pooled data of France, Germany, Ireland and Spain, 1994-1996
CIS2 (manufacturing/services)
Explanatory variables Estimates with industry effects Estimates without industry effects
Probit on innovation
Scientific sectors - 0.634  (20.82)
Log of number of employees 0.373  (25.38) 0.385  (27.02)
Belonging to a group 0.262  (7.32) 0.252  (7.24)
Growth in employment 0.309  ( 3.76) 0.311  (3.90)
Recent merger -0.064  (-0.89) -0.051  (-0.72)
Ordered probit on information from Universities/Government labs
Scientific sectors - 0.148  (1.26)
Log of number of employees 0.156  (2.35) 0.161  (2.52)
Belonging to a group 0.017  (0.23) 0.007  (0.09)
Growth in employment 0.156  (1.21) 0.101  (0.80)
Government support 0.530  (11.76) 0.540  (12.0)
Recent merger 0.036  (0.40) 0.056  (0.64)
Patents applied for 0.288  (5.23) 0.261  (4.93)
R&D/sales 1.627  ( 3.23) 1.098  (2.25)
Other-than-R&D innov. expend/sales -0.243  (-0.63) -0.285  (-0.72)
Being a radical innovator 0.109  (2.60) 0.109  (2.70)
r -0.037  (-0.12) -0.059  (-0.20)
Log likelihood -8192.86 -8420.399
Number of observations 9191 9191
Note: bold = significant at 5% level. Asymptotic-t statistics in parentheses.
The estimated coefficients of the industry and country dummies in the probit and ordered probit and of the thresholds in
the ordered probit are not reported.
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Table 3.  Marginal effects of explanatory variables on probability to innovate and information sourcing for innovation
(in percentage points)
Pooled data of France, Germany, Ireland and Spain, 1994-1996
CIS2 (manufacturing/services)
Intensity of information sourcing from universities/govt labsExplanatory
variables
Probability to
innovate 0 1 2 3
Log of number
of employees
13.6 -2.1 0.7 1.4 0.0
Belonging to a
group
9.5 -0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0
Growth in
employment
11.3 -2.1 0.7 1.4 0.0
Recent merger -2.3 -0.5 0.2 0.3 0.0
Government
support
-7.1 2.5 4.6 0.0
Patents applied
for
-3.9 1.4 2.5 0.0
R&D/sales -21.9 7.7           14.2 0.0
Other-than-R&D
innovation
expend/sales
3.3 -1.1 -2.1 0.0
Radical
innovator
-1.4 0.5 0.9 0.0
Note: The figures correspond to the estimates with industry effects.
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Table 4. Estimation of a trivariate probit with censoring on probabilities to innovate, cooperate and cooperate with
universities/govt. labs
Pooled data of France, Germany, Ireland and Spain1994-1996
CIS2 (manufacturing/services)
Explanatory variables Estimates Marginal effects in percentage pointson cumulative decisions
Probit on innovation
Scientific sectors 0.751  (24.19) 28.9
Log of number of employees 0.467  (31.92) 18.0
Belonging to a group 0.209  (5.92)   8.0
Growth in employment 0.340 (4.27) 13.1
Recent merger -0.036  (-0.48) -1.4
Probit on cooperation conditional on innovating
Scientific sectors 0.148  (3.19) 2.1
Log of number of employees 0.193  (9.34) 2.7
Belonging to a group 0.335  (6.26) 4.7
Growth in employment 0.098  (0.79) 1.4
Government support 0.744  (15.16)                           10.4
R&D/sales 0.963  (1.72)                           13.4
Being a radical innovator 0.146  (3.21) 2.0
Recent merger 0.108  (1.21)                             1.5
Patents applied for 0.137  (2.40)                             1.9
Other-than-R&D innovation expend. 1.673  (3.97) 23.3
Probit on cooperation with universities/govt. labs conditional on
innovating and cooperating
Scientific sectors 0.172  (2.58) 1.7
Log of number of employees 0.110  (3.86) 1.6
Belonging to a group -0.188  (-2.29) 1.0
Growth in employment 0.098  (0.54) 1.0
Government support 0.803  (12.17) 8.1
R&D/sales 0.756  (1.05)                             9.1
Being a radical innovator -0.022  (-0.33) 0.7
Recent merger 0.184  (1.49) 1.5
Patents applied for 0.257  (3.19)                            2.0
Other-than-R&D innovation expend. -0.619  (-1.09)                            6.6
r12 0
r13 0
r23 0
Log of likelihood -8084.12
Number of observations 9191
Note: bold = significant at 5% level. Asymptotic-t statistics in parentheses.
The constant term and the estimated coefficients of the country dummies are not reported.
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Appendix 1
Industry definitions
Industry        NACE Industry definition
Abbreviation code
(rev.1)
Manfacturing
FOOD 15-16 manufacture of food, beverages and tobacco
TEXTILE 17-19 manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of 
fur, tannings and dressing of leather, luggage, handbags, saddlery, 
harness and footwear
WOOD     20-22 manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork, except 
furniture, manufacture of straw and plaiting materials, pulp, paper,
and paper products,  publishing, printing, and reproduction of recorded media
CHEM 23-24 manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel,
  manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
PLASTIC 25 manufacture of rubber and plastic products
NON-MET 26 manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
METAL 27-28 manufacture of basic metals, fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment
M&E 29 manufacture of machinery and equipment NEC
ELEC 30-33 manufacture of office machinery and computers, electrical 
machinery  and apparatus, radio, television and communication 
 equipment and apparatus, medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks
VEHIC 34-35 manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers, and other 
transport equipment
NEC 36 manufacture of furniture, manufacturing NEC
Services
SUPPLIES 40-41 electricity, gas and water supply
WHOLES 51 wholesale
TRANSP 60-62 transport
TELECOM 64 telecommunications
FINANCE 65-67 financial intermediation
COMPUT 72 computer and related activities
ENGINEE 74 engineering services
N.B. Industries in bold are classified among the scientific sectors.
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